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In its Microsoft decision2 almost nine years ago, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia made clear that the possession 
of a copyright does not confer immunity from monopolization liability 
on acts involving the restrictive licensing of the copyrighted work.  
Employing a memorable analogy, the court stated: 
Microsoft's primary copyright argument borders 
upon the frivolous. The company claims an absolute and 
unfettered right to use its intellectual property as it wishes: 
“[I]f intellectual property rights have been lawfully 
acquired,” it says, then “their subsequent exercise cannot 
give rise to antitrust liability.”  That is no more correct than 
the proposition that use of one's personal property, such as a 
baseball bat, cannot give rise to tort liability.3 
In interpreting the anti-monopolization provisions (Section 2) 
of the Sherman Act, the courts have been less clear about the potential 
for liability that may arise from the refusal to license a patented 
product.  A monopolist can sometimes harm competition by refusing 
patent licenses to would-be customers who do business with the 
monopolist’s competitors.4  Nevertheless, some courts have gone so 
                                                
1 Associate Professor, University of North Carolina School of Law.  The author 
wishes to thank Michael Carrier and Hanno Kaiser for helpful comments on an 
earlier version.  Portions of this article were supported by the American Antitrust 
Institute.  Some contributors to the AAI may have an interest in the issues discussed 
in this paper.  A list of contributors to the AAI is available upon request. 
2 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
3 Id. at 63 (citation omitted).  The court did allow one exception, concluding that 
Microsoft was allowed to prohibit PC manufacturers from altering Windows so 
drastically as to “automatically prevent[] the Windows desktop from ever being seen 
by the user….”  Id. 
4 See Seungwoo Son, Selective Refusals to Sell Patented Goods: The Relationship 
Between Patent Rights and Antitrust Law, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 109, 147-
48. 
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far as to suggest that unilateral refusals to license a patent are always 
legal, except where there is a separate basis for legal liability.5 
The legal ambiguity over patent licensing poses obvious 
difficulties for antitrust enforcers tasked with prosecuting companies 
that monopolize markets in high-tech industries.  Until recently, 
however, the Justice Department manifested little interest in pursuing 
cases that might clarify the law in this area.  The agency under Bush 
brought no monopolization cases, as then-Sen. Barack Obama 
critically observed during his presidential run.6 
The Justice Department in 2008 also issued a report, 
Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct Under Section 2 of 
the Sherman Act, which expressed the agency’s policy approach of 
allowing monopolists to engage in unilateral, unconditional refusals to 
deal, including refusals to license intellectual property, without facing 
meaningful antitrust scrutiny.7  The Obama administration’s first 
Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Department’s Antitrust 
Division, Christine A. Varney, signaled a major shift in enforcement 
policy when she ordered the withdrawal of the agency’s Section 2 
report on May 11, 2009,8 barely three weeks into her term of office.9 
                                                
5 See infra text accompanying note 79. 
6 See Senator Barack Obama, Statement to the American Antitrust Institute (Sept. 27, 
2007) (transcript available in the American Antitrust Institute Archives) (noting that 
in the last “seven years, the Bush Justice Department has not brought a single 
monopolization case”). 
7 See U.S. Department of Justice, Competition and Monopoly: Single-Firm Conduct 
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act 129 (2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.htm (last visited June 19, 2010) 
(concluding that “antitrust liability for unilateral, unconditional refusals to deal with 
rivals should not play a meaningful part in [Sherman Act] section 2 enforcement”).  
Regarding intellectual property licensing, the report states: 
If a monopolist has something that a rival wants to use to make 
more, different, or better products, it can appear that consumers 
would be better off if the monopolist were forced to deal with its 
rival. But if the monopolist is forced to deal with the rival, the 
monopolist’s incentives to spend the necessary time and resources 
to innovate may be diminished. Moreover, the incentives of other 
firms to invest and innovate, considering the potential future 
returns on their investments, may be diminished if they believe 
they will be forced to share a successful innovation. If the 
incentives to innovate are diminished, consumers are likely 
harmed in the long run. 
Id. at 119.  For an opposing view, see, e.g., F.M. Scherer, The Political Economy of 
Patent Policy Reform in the United States, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 167 
(2009). 
8 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Withdraws Report on 
Antitrust Monopoly Law (May 11, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/May 
/09-at-459.html. 
9 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Eric Holder Welcomes 
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The Antitrust Division’s recently reported opening of an 
investigation into IBM’s conduct in the mainframe computer 
industry10 appears to confirm this shift in Section 2 enforcement, and 
raises the possibility that the agency will seek clarification from the 
courts as to whether and when the restrictive licensing of patented 
technology can give rise to monopolization liability.  The investigation 
appears to arise from complaints that IBM has blocked competitors 
from building IBM-compatible mainframes by refusing to license 
patents needed to achieve compatibility,11 but may extend to a wider 
range of conduct. 
Should the investigation lead to an enforcement action, the 
courts will have a further opportunity to clarify the antitrust 
obligations and intellectual property rights of a monopolist who relies 
primarily on patents, rather than copyrights, to protect its technology.  
Given IBM’s importance to the information technology industry as the 
owner of the world’s largest patent portfolio,12 such a case could be 
accurately described as the patent-oriented sequel to the Microsoft 
litigation, which itself had been cut short in 2001 by a regime change 
at the Justice Department.13  
In contrast to the D.C. Circuit’s dismissal of Microsoft’s 
copyright counterclaims, antitrust challenges to IBM’s current 
mainframe licensing practices thus far have encountered broad judicial 
deference to IBM’s patent rights.  The purpose of this Article is to 
analyze and critique these contrasting approaches and to situate the 
current litigation and investigation involving IBM in the still-unsettled 
doctrinal context at the intersection of intellectual property and 
antitrust law.  The remainder of this Article is organized as follows.  
                                                                                                               
Assistant Attorneys General for Antitrust, Civil and Criminal Divisions (Apr. 20, 
2009), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/April/09-ag-370.html. 
10 See Stephen Foley, IBM Faces Probe Over Competition Concerns, INDEPENDENT 
(U.K.), Oct. 9, 2009, at 54. 
11 See T3 Technologies, Inc.’s Amended Petition for Intervention and Complaint for 
Damages, Int’l Business Machines Corp. v. Platform Solutions, Inc., 658 F. Supp. 2d 
603 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 06 Civ. 13565) [hereinafter “T3 Complaint”]. 
12 See IBM, IBM Intellectual Property and Licensing, 
http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/patents/portfolio.shtml (last visited May 16, 
2010) (“For each of the past 15 years (1993-2007), IBM has been granted more U.S. 
patents than any other company.”). 
13 See, e.g., Harry First & Andrew I. Gavil, Re-Framing Windows: The Durable 
Meaning of the Microsoft Antitrust Litigation, 2006 UTAH L. REV. 641, 687-89 
(stating that the 2000 election “certainly affect[ed] the continuation of the 
[Microsoft] litigation,” i.e., through incoming Assistant Attorney General Charles 
James’s decisions to abandon structural relief and the tying claim); Andrew Chin, 
Decoding Microsoft:  A First Principles Approach, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 80-
81 (2005) (arguing that the Justice Department’s abandonment of the tying claim 
amounted to an acquiescence in Microsoft’s theory of the case). 
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Section I outlines a doctrinal analysis of the Microsoft tying claim that 
bolsters the D.C. Circuit’s broad pronouncement that the challenged 
conduct exceeded the scope of Microsoft’s rights under copyright law.  
Section II draws parallels between Microsoft’s and IBM’s conduct as 
examples of alleged opportunism by operating system vendors who 
enjoy monopoly power and a locked-in installed base.  Section III 
describes the changed circumstances that allegedly provided IBM in 
2001 with a new opportunity to exploit its installed base of mainframe 
users.  Section IV describes the pending antitrust case arising from that 
alleged exploitation brought by T3 Technologies, a system integrator 
that markets compatible alternatives to IBM’s mainframe platform.  
Section V situates the T3 litigation in the relevant case law and 
discusses issues left unresolved by the leading precedents.  Section VI 
concludes. 
 
I.  ANTITRUST AND THE SCOPE OF MICROSOFT’S COPYRIGHT 
 
As Microsoft learned, software licensing is a contracting 
activity that can constitute an exclusionary practice subject to antitrust 
scrutiny.  When a licensing practice is challenged, antitrust liability 
can turn on whether the practice is deemed to be a legitimate exercise 
of rights that were lawfully acquired under the federal copyright 
laws.14 
Increasingly, software products are marketed to consumers 
under terms and conditions that purport to extend the vendor’s rights 
beyond the scope defined by the Copyright Act.15  As many 
commentators have noted, these transactional practices may have the 
effect of overriding the balance of public policy interests embodied in 
the federal copyright statute.16  Of particular concern in the antitrust 
                                                
14 See, e.g., United States v. Loew’s, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 47-48 (1962) (condemning 
the block booking of separately copyrighted motion pictures for television exhibition 
as a tying arrangement under § 1 of the Sherman Act); CSU, L.L.C. v. Xerox Corp. 
(In re Independent Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig.), 203 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (rejecting unilateral refusal to license claim for lack of evidence that 
copyrights were obtained by unlawful means or were used to gain monopoly power 
beyond the statutory copyright granted by Congress). 
15 See, e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003), cert. 
denied, 123 S.Ct. 2588 (2003) (holding that a “shrinkwrap” license agreement that 
overrode limitations on the copyright owner’s rights under the Copyright Act was 
enforceable under state contract law); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th 
Cir. 1996) (same). 
16 There is an extensive literature on the preemption of state contract law by federal 
copyright law, and the enforceability of shrinkwrap and clickwrap license 
agreements (i.e., standard form license agreements that assert that the act of opening 
a box, or downloading files, containing software signifies the consumer’s assent to 
the license terms).  For commentary on preemption, see, e.g., Maureen A. O’Rourke, 
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context is the balance between the constitutional purpose to “promote 
the progress of science . . . by securing for limited times to authors . . . 
the exclusive right to their respective writings”17 and the Sherman 
Act’s “general prohibition on unreasonable restraints of trade.”18 
In addressing this balance, antitrust doctrine draws a 
fundamental distinction between trade restraints that inhere in the 
rights conferred by the intellectual property laws, and trade restraints 
that result from the contractual or technological exploitation of those 
rights.  While intellectual property rights themselves may restrain 
competition by subjecting competing suppliers to civil liability for 
certain kinds of productive activities (i.e., those involving 
infringement), the legitimate acquisition and enforcement of rights 
under the intellectual property laws are generally not subject to 
antitrust scrutiny.19  Transactions involving intellectual property 
rights, however, may be subject to antitrust challenges based on the 
owner’s conduct in exploiting those rights through contractual or 
technological means.20   
As I argued more fully in a 2005 treatise-length article in the 
Wake Forest Law Review,21 Microsoft’s Windows operating system, 
                                                                                                               
Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of 
Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479 (1995).  For commentary on shrinkwrap 
and clickwrap agreements, see, e.g., Garry L. Founds, Note, Shrinkwrap and 
Clickwrap Agreements: 2B or Not 2B?, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 99 (1999); Dennis S. 
Karjala, Federal Preemption of Shrinkwrap and On-Line Licenses, 22 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 511 (1997); Mark Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 
S. CAL. L. REV. 1239 (1995); Mark Lemley, Shrinkwraps in Cyberspace, 35 
JURIMETRICS J. 311 (1995); Apik Minassian, The Death of Copyright: Enforceability 
of Shrinkwrap Licensing Agreements, 45 UCLA L. REV. 569 (1997). 
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
18 Times-Picayune Pub. Co. v. U.S., 345 U.S. 594, 614 (1953).  
19 See generally HERBERT HOVENKAMP ET AL., IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF 
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 13.3, at 13-10 
(2003) (stating that antitrust law generally imposes a duty to license intellectual 
property only in cases where “an intellectual property owner has sought to expand 
the scope of its right beyond what the intellectual property laws grant it”). 
20 See, e.g., Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. U.S., 306 U.S. 208, 230 (1939) (“An agreement 
illegal because it suppresses competition is not any less so because the competitive 
article is copyrighted.”); Data Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Supp. Corp., 36 F.3d 
1147, 1185 n.63 (1st Cir. 1994) (“It is in any event well settled that concerted and 
contractual behavior that threatens competition is not immune from antitrust inquiry 
simply because it involves the exercise of copyright privileges.”); cf. Eastman Kodak 
Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 479 n.29 (1992) (citations 
omitted) (“The Court has held many times that power gained through some natural 
and legal advantage such as a patent, copyright, or business acumen can give rise to 
liability if ‘a seller exploits his dominant position in one market to expand his empire 
into the next.’”). 
21 Andrew Chin, Decoding Microsoft: A First Principles Approach, 40 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 1 (2005). 
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its Internet Explorer Web browser, and most other software products 
distributed under mass-market copyright licenses are properly 
understood as bundles of legal rights and technological capabilities 
that confer the ability to use software for specified purposes, but do 
not include any software per se.22  (Thus, it is inaccurate to refer to 
Internet Explorer as “integrated” into Windows 98,23 because the fact 
that some of the same Windows 98 code is used to support both 
operating system and browsing functionalities, while arguably 
innovative, is irrelevant to the question of whether Windows and 
Internet Explorer are separate products.24) 
Microsoft’s inclusion of a Web browser software product in 
Windows 98 involved at least four understood tying conditions25 
implemented through contractual or technological means.26  First, 
Microsoft offered Windows 98 to end users only under form license 
agreements that granted sufficient legal rights to install and run the 
Windows 98 software on a system according to the documentation for 
both operating system and Web browsing purposes.27  Second, 
Microsoft refused to allow its OEM licensee-distributors to alter the 
Windows 98 software or remove the desktop icons that were the 
principal documented means by which end users of Windows 98 could 
obtain technological access to Microsoft’s Web browser software 
product.28 Third, Microsoft excluded its Web browser software 
product from the Add/Remove Programs facility that was the principal 
documented means by which end users of Windows 98 could remove 
technological access to software products.29  Finally, when a retail 
consumer chose to use a non-Microsoft Web browser software product 
as the default, “Windows 98 nevertheless require[d] the user to 
employ Internet Explorer in numerous situations that, from the user’s 
perspective, [we]re entirely unexpected.”30 
                                                
22 See id. at 5. 
23 See id. at 7-8 n.24. 
24 See id. at 102-05. 
25 An understood tying condition may include any conduct by the seller that leads 
reasonable buyers to understand that they cannot get the tying product unless they 
also take the tied product.  10 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, EINER ELHAUGE & HERBERT 
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1754c, at 303-04 (1996). 
26 See Chin, supra note 21, at 112-13. 
27 See End User License Agreement for Microsoft Windows 98, 
http://www.teamnacer.co.cc/siteglobalinlinux/eula98.html (annotating license 
agreement with critical comments) (last visited May 18, 2010); see also United 
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d at 84 (restating district court finding that 
“Microsoft required licensees of Windows 95 and 98 also to license IE as a bundle at 
a single price”). 
28 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 61, ¶ 213 (D.D.C. 1999).  
29 See id. at 52, ¶ 170. 
30 See id. at 52-53, ¶¶ 171-72. 
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Such conditions on the use of software products that 
functionally override consumer choice frustrate the Copyright Act’s 
scheme for guaranteeing consumers the right to use every software 
product for the purpose “for which it was both sold and purchased.”31  
As I have argued more fully elsewhere,32 sections 102(b) and 117 of 
the Copyright Act have been interpreted to ensure a well-functioning 
software product market, inasmuch as a consumer of a software 
product is entitled to the benefit of the bargain — i.e., the ability to 
link, load and execute the same code that the vendor chose to 
implement the product’s intended purposes.  There is no warrant in the 
Copyright Act for restraints that impede competing software 
developers from determining which code is to be executed when 
consumers choose to use their products.33 
Accordingly, the practices challenged under the Microsoft 
tying claim cannot be characterized as a legitimate exercise of 
software copyrights.34  Even though the government did not pursue 
this argument, and ultimately dropped its tying claim,35 Microsoft 
should be noted as a case where software copyright protection failed to 
confer antitrust immunity on the arguably innovative but exclusionary 
conduct of an operating system monopolist.  With this background, we 
now consider IBM’s position as an operating system monopolist 
accused of exclusionary practices involving its patented software 
technologies. 
 
II.  OPERATING SYSTEM LOCK-IN AND INSTALLED BASE 
OPPORTUNISM 
 
In the same way that PC users tend to find themselves 
dependent on Microsoft’s Windows,36  businesses and organizations 
that use mainframe computers can get locked in to IBM’s operating 
system.  IBM has enjoyed a monopoly in the worldwide market for 
mainframe computers for most of its history as a company.  
Mainframes are a class of computer characterized by an extremely 
high level of reliability, availability and serviceability.  They are used 
                                                
31 See NAT’L COMM’N ON NEW TECHNNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, 
FINAL REPORT 31-33 (1978). 
32 Andrew Chin, Antitrust Analysis in Software Product Markets: A First Principles 
Approach, 18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 49-72 (2004). 
33 Id. at 72 (citations omitted). 
34 In other words, the conduct challenged under the Microsoft tying claim amounted 
to a use of Microsoft’s copyright to gain monopoly power beyond the statutory 
copyright granted by Congress.  See In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig., 203 
F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
35 See First & Gavil, supra note 13. 
36 See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 15. 
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primarily by large businesses and government agencies to process data 
in their ongoing operations.37   
Lock-in results from the fact that most applications software 
products are designed and sold to run on a specific operating system 
and will not work on any other.38  Over time, computer users tend not 
only to become accustomed to the applications they use, but also to 
generate large volumes of data and other auxiliary files that are 
specific to those applications.  This reliance on specific applications is 
especially strong in the case of mainframe-based applications, which 
are often highly customized and mission critical.39  The prospect of 
losing these operating system-specific investments of money and time 
can deter computer users from switching to a different operating 
system. 40  In this way, high switching costs lead to consumer lock-in. 
An operating system monopolist can take advantage of 
consumer lock-in by imposing increasingly onerous conditions on its 
installed base of existing customers.  The monopolist may introduce 
newer, more expensive versions of the operating system while 
discontinuing older, less expensive versions.  While newer versions of 
an operating system may include beneficial innovations, existing 
customers may end up paying a higher price for new features they do 
not need.  The monopolist may also try to require its customers to 
purchase another of its products, or forbid them from purchasing a 
competitor’s product.41 
Monopolists who exploit their ability to extract such 
concessions from a locked-in installed base are said to be engaging in 
installed base opportunism.42  Installed base opportunism may not be a 
profitable strategy if large numbers of consumers come to recognize 
the long-term burdens of ownership and become discouraged from 
buying the monopolist’s product in the first place.43  In the Microsoft 
case, however, the courts found that Microsoft was able to exploit its 
installed base because dissatisfied consumers did not have an 
alternative to Windows that could support a comparable range of 
software applications.44 
                                                
37 See IBM v. Platform Solutions, 658 F. Supp. 2d 603, 605 (S.D. N.Y. 2009). 
38 See id. at 606 (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 12 
(D.D.C. 1999)). 
39 See T3 Complaint, supra note 10, at ¶ 22-23. 
40 See Microsoft, 84 F. Supp. 2d at 15. 
41 See id. at 48. 
42 See Carl Shapiro, Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak, 
63 ANTITRUST L.J. 483, 488 (1995); Post-Chicago Analysis After Kodak: Interview 
with Professor Steven C. Salop, ANTITRUST, Fall/Winter 1992, at 20, 21. 
43 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 470 
(1992). 
44 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 19-25, ¶ 213 (D.D.C. 1999).at 
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Similarly, according to the complaints now before the Justice 
Department, IBM has little to fear from the loss of sales to consumers 
who might object to the company’s treatment of its installed base of 
mainframe users.  This is because recent initial purchasers of high-end 
computer systems tend instead to choose more scalable and affordable 
solutions, such as PC server clusters (“server-based computing”) and 
cloud computing services.45  The vast majority of the potential users of 
mainframe computers were already locked into IBM’s operating 
system long ago. 
Even though relatively few new customers are joining their 
ranks, mainframe computer users do constitute a significant and 
growing market for data processing power.  Over $1 trillion worth of 
corporate application software currently relies on IBM mainframes, 
and the volume of transactions processed by IBM’s mainframe 
customers will “easily double” between 2006 and 2010.46  Many other 
computer companies are interested in offering competing and 
complementary products to these mainframe customers.  The 
complaints before the Justice Department allege that since 2001, IBM 
has engaged in several forms of installed-base opportunism with the 
purpose and effect of blocking competition from these companies and 
reinforcing consumer lock-in. 
 
 III.  IBM’S NEW-FOUND FREEDOM 
 
IBM’s alleged aggressiveness since 2001 can be traced to the 
company’s release from the terms of a 1956 antitrust settlement 
agreement.  The settlement was the result of a 1952 monopolization 
case against IBM, in which the Justice Department alleged that IBM 
had obtained and maintained monopoly power in the market for 
tabulating machines and cards and had used exclusionary leasing 
agreements to restrain the development of competing computer 
manufacturers and maintenance and repair companies.47 
                                                                                                               
19-25. 
45 According to IDC’s Worldwide Quarterly Server Tracker, IBM sold 2,395 new 
mainframes in 2008 out of a total of 8.1 million servers.  See OpenMainframe.org, 
Understanding IBM’s Mainframe Monopoly, 2, http://openmainframe.org/ 
downloads/resources/Understanding_IBMs_Mainframe_Monopoly.pdf (last 
accessed June 19, 2010); see also T3 Complaint, supra note 10, at ¶ 24. 
46 IBM Press Release, IBM Unveils Software & ISV Initiatives to Handle Surge in 
Mainframe Transactions (May 8, 2006), http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/ 
pressrelease/19620.wss. 
47 See Evan R. Chesler, The 1956 Consent Decree, CA26 ALI-ABA 159, 163 
(1996); Memorandum of Law in Support of IBM’s Motion to Terminate the 1956 
Consent Decree, United States v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., No. 72-344, 1994 WL 
16188213 (S.D. N.Y. June 13,	  1994).	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While some of the restrictions expired within the first ten 
years,48 most of the consent decree provisions were still in force in 
1994, when IBM moved to terminate the decree.49  Those provisions 
included: 
(1) a requirement that IBM sell its computers at prices that 
have a commercially reasonable relationship to the lease charges for 
the same computers;50 
(2) a restriction on IBM’s ability to re-acquire previously sold 
IBM computers;51 
(3) a requirement that IBM offer to sell used IBM computers 
acquired as trade-ins;52 
(4) a requirement that IBM provide the same services to 
computer owners as to lessees, and at reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory prices;53 
(5) a requirement that IBM allow third-party maintenance, 
experimentation with, alterations in, and attachments to purchased 
IBM computers;54 
(6) a requirement that IBM operate its service bureau business 
under a subsidiary;55 
(7) a requirement that IBM furnish to IBM computer owners 
the same service documentation used by IBM’s repair and 
maintenance organization;56 
(8) a prohibition against certain agreements to allocate markets 
or to restrain U.S. imports or exports;57 and 
(9) a prohibition against conditioning the sale or lease of a 
computer upon the purchase or lease of any other computer.58 
In 1995, the Justice Department tentatively agreed to terminate 
the portions of the decree concerning requirements (3) and (5), and all 
other provisions as they applied to IBM’s personal computers and 
                                                
48 See Memorandum of Law in Support of IBM’s Motion to Terminate the 1956 
Consent Decree, United States v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 1994 WL 16188213, at 
*3 n.1.	  
49 United States v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., No. 52 CIV. 72-344 TPG., 1997 WL 
217588, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 1997). 
50 See Final Judgment at § IV, United States v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., Civ. No. 
72-344 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1956), available at http://www.cptech.org/at/ibm/ 
ibm1956cd.html [hereinafter “1956 Consent Decree”]. 
51 Id. § V. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. § VI. 
54 See id. § VII. 
55 Id. § VIII. 
56 Id. § IX. 
57 See id. § XV. 
58 Id. 
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workstations.59  Following a public comment period, Judge Thomas P. 
Griesa of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New 
York ordered termination of these portions of the decree in January 
1996.60 
The Justice Department subsequently joined IBM in filing a 
July 1996 motion to phase out the remaining portions of the decree by 
July 2001.61  These provisions related to IBM’s System/390 
mainframe and AS/400 mid-range computer systems.62  Accepting 
expert reports that IBM’s AS/400 already faced a competitive market 
and IBM’s System/390 enjoyed only “limited and diminishing” market 
power,63 the government found that neither of the markets in which 
these systems competed presented serious long-term competitive 
concerns.  In its briefs supporting the joint motion, the government 
concluded that “IBM is unlikely to be able to exercise market power 
against any significant category of equipment customers in 2001,” and 
that “[t]ermination of the decree is also unlikely to increase the 
possibility that IBM could exercise market power in hardware 
maintenance aftermarkets.”64 
Judge Griesa agreed to the phase-out plan.  In a May 1997 
opinion, he found that “[t]here is an active competitive market in 
computers today, the nature and extent makes obsolete this 40-year-
old decree.”65  Judge Griesa specifically addressed the concerns of 
independent computer maintenance companies that the phase-out 
would allow IBM to restrict the supply of spare parts for its 
computers.  He noted that “the heart of IBM’s business is selling and 
leasing computers,” and IBM would not want to discourage customers 
from buying and leasing IBM mainframes by impairing “their ability 
to obtain maintenance and repair services where they desire to do 
so.”66  Judge Griesa reasoned that IBM would be unlikely to engage in 
installed base opportunism because of the ability of consumers to 
switch to non-IBM computers: 
IBM's customers are generally well informed about the 
lifetime cost of a computer (including service) and there are 
                                                
59 See United States’ Memorandum in Support of Joint Motion to Modify the 1956 
Final Judgment and Response to Public Comments, United States v. Int’l Bus. 
Machines Corp., No. 72-344, 857 F.Supp. 1089, 1996 WL 33671050 (S.D. N.Y. 
Nov. 13, 1996) (hereinafter “U.S. Motion to Terminate”). 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
62 Id. 
63 See id. 
64 See id. 
65 United States v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., No. 52 CIV. 72-344 TPG., 1997 WL 
217588, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 1997). 
66 Id. at *3. 
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strong indications that they are quite willing to purchase 
non-IBM computers if the lifetime costs of IBM machines 
should become excessive.  Realistically, the market as it 
exists today is a powerful deterrent against IBM engaging in 
monopolistic tactics designed to shut off the supply of parts 
to independent repair companies.  By the same token, IBM 
has every incentive to compete in the repair market by 
offering better services and lower costs.67 
In December 1998, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
agreed with Judge Griesa’s reasoning, and affirmed the order to phase 
out the decree.68 
Soon after these court decisions, the mainframe computer 
industry underwent some unforeseen changes.  In 2000, two major 
IBM-compatible mainframe manufacturers, Amdahl and Hitachi, 
abandoned the market, leaving IBM as the sole manufacturer of 
mainframe computer equipment.  Also, around the same time, PC 
server clusters emerged as an economically viable, and increasingly 
preferred, alternative to mainframes among new buyers as a high-end 
computing solution.  These developments left locked-in mainframe 
users with no alternative equipment supplier, and left relatively few 
new buyers in the market to deter IBM from engaging in installed base 
opportunism.  Thus, IBM’s decision in 1999 to discontinue its smaller, 
slower mainframes (i.e., those capable of performing fewer than 60 
million instructions per second) raised concerns that the company was 
trying to force its locked-in customers to spend substantial sums to 
upgrade to IBM’s more-expensive machines which offered more 
power than they needed.69 
In focusing on maintenance and repair services, Judge Griesa’s 
analysis also did not foresee the group of competitors who would 
allegedly be targeted by IBM’s opportunistic strategies.  Since the 
mid-1990s, various companies have been working to develop 
alternative technologies that allow mainframe software applications to 
run on less expensive non-IBM computer systems (also known as 
alternative “mainframe platforms”).  These alternative approaches 
have relied in part on IBM’s patented technology and proprietary 
information relating to its mainframe operating system.  According to 
the complaints before the Justice Department, since 2001 IBM has 
harmed competition in the mainframe platform market by refusing to 
license its operating system technology to the developers, providers 
and users of these mainframe platform alternatives. 
In short, consumers are no longer protected by the “active 
                                                
67 Id. 
68 United States v. Int’l Bus. Machines Corp., 163 F.3d 742 (2d Cir. 1998). 
69 See T3 Complaint, supra note 10 at ¶¶ 7, 92. 
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competitive market in computers” that spurred the district court’s 
decision to terminate the 1956 consent decree, and IBM’s post-
termination conduct has raised installed base opportunism concerns 
that were not contemplated at any point by the Justice Department or 
by Judge Griesa. 
 
 IV.  T3’S ANTITRUST COMPLAINT AGAINST IBM 
 
IBM’s alleged refusals to license its operating system 
technology stand in contrast to the company’s historic policy of 
licensing patents to third parties under reasonable and 
nondiscriminatory terms,70 including to some of the companies that 
were developing and marketing alternatives to the IBM mainframe 
platform.  IBM initially granted one such company, Platform 
Solutions, Inc. (“PSI”), a license to use IBM’s 31-bit mainframe 
operating system (“OS/390”), but subsequently withdrew the license.  
When PSI continued to develop and market its alternative mainframe 
platforms, IBM sued PSI for breach of its software licenses and 
infringement of patents covering various platform features 
implemented in or accessed through OS/390 and its new 64-bit 
operating system (“z/OS”).71  IBM subsequently mooted the dispute 
by acquiring PSI,72 but not before another company, T3 Technologies, 
intervened in the IBM v. PSI case complaining of antitrust violations 
by IBM. 
T3 is a system integrator: it combines software and hardware 
components from various suppliers into ready-to-use computer 
systems.  T3 has historically focused on serving small and medium 
businesses and organizations that use mainframe software but do not 
require massive computing power. 
T3’s “tServer” product served these small customers’ needs 
when IBM discontinued its smaller mainframes in 2000.  The tServer 
used software developed by Fundamental Software, Inc. (“FSI”) to 
support IBM’s 31-bit mainframe instruction set on an Intel-based 
server.  FSI had obtained patent licenses from IBM under reasonable 
and nondiscriminatory terms for the technologies that FSI’s software 
                                                
70 See Archive of IBM Worldwide Patent Licensing Practices (2006), 
http://web.archive.org/web/20060220102134/http://www.ibm.com/ibm/licensing/pat
ents/practices.shtml (“IBM has an open approach to patent licensing for products in 
the Information Technology (IT) field and is generally willing to grant nonexclusive 
licenses under reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms and conditions to those who 
in turn respect IBM’s intellectual property (IP) rights.”) (last visited June 19, 2010). 
71 See T3 Complaint, supra note 10. 
72 See Press Release, IBM, IBM Acquires Platform Solutions (July 2, 2008) 
(http://www-03.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/24560.wss#release). 
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needed to interoperate with OS/390.  According to T3’s complaint, in 
2003, after IBM introduced z/OS and discontinued OS/390, IBM 
refused to sell FSI a license so that FSI could make its software 
compatible with z/OS, and refused to license z/OS to FSI for sale to 
commercial end-users.  As a result, T3 was unable to produce a 
version of the tServer for use with z/OS, the only mainframe operating 
system IBM continues to support.73 
T3 subsequently sought to offer a “Liberty Server” product, 
which used software from PSI to support IBM’s 64-bit mainframe 
instruction set on a Hewlett-Packard server.  According to T3’s 
complaint, IBM has not only refused to license its OS/390- and z/OS-
related patents and product interface information to PSI, but has 
refused to license z/OS to customers unless they purchased or 
continued using an IBM mainframe.  T3 also alleges that IBM has 
falsely informed T3’s customers that using a Liberty Server would 
cause a loss of reliability, availability, and serviceability.74 
T3’s complaint alleges that IBM’s actions constitute 
monopolization and attempted monopolization in violation of Section 
2 of the Sherman Act and tying in violation of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act, as well as violations of 
various state antitrust, contract, and deceptive practice laws.75   
On September 30, Judge Griesa’s colleague, Judge Lewis A. 
Kaplan, dismissed T3’s complaint on the grounds that T3 had not 
shown that it had been directly injured by any of the alleged antitrust 
violations and therefore lacked standing to bring the lawsuit.76  Judge 
Kaplan also held that IBM was free to refuse to deal with FSI and PSI.  
Citing the Supreme Court’s 2004 Verizon v. Trinko decision, Judge 
Kaplan held that a unilateral termination of a course of dealing cannot 
violate the antitrust laws unless the defendant has “foregone short term 
profits by refusing to license its patents ‘to achieve an anticompetitive 
end.’”77  In support of his conclusion that IBM’s refusal to license its 
operating system technology did not fall into this “limited exception,” 
he reasoned as follows: 
IBM invested billions of dollars to develop its sixty-four bit 
operating systems, which contain numerous technical 
improvements over its thirty-one bit technology. It 
introduced them to make its operating systems more 
functional and competitive with distributed systems [e.g., 
                                                
73 See T3 Complaint, supra note 10, at ¶ 8. 
74 See id. at ¶ 11. 
75 See id. at ¶¶ 104-58. 
76 See IBM v. Platform Solutions, 658 F. Supp. 2d at 609. 
77 See id. at 614 (quoting Verizon Commc'ns v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 
LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004)). 
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server clusters] as the market for thirty-one bit technology 
waned.   In these circumstances, IBM is not required to 
support and maintain its thirty-one bit technology.  IBM's 
refusal to support and license its operating system to FSI and 
PSI therefore does not constitute anticompetitive conduct 
under the Sherman Act. 
Notably, Judge Kaplan’s decision did not review any of the claims of 
the asserted patents, and therefore did not treat the scope of IBM’s 
patent protection as a relevant consideration in conferring antitrust 
immunity on IBM’s exclusionary conduct.  On their face, the five 
patents in suit appear to be narrowly directed to specific features of the 
OS/390 and z/OS platforms,78 but a careful determination of their 
scope and implications for monopoly power would necessitate a more 
developed factual record.79 
T3 is appealing Judge Kaplan’s decision.80  In the meantime, 
the Justice Department is reviewing the merits of T3’s allegations.81 
 
 V.  ANTITRUST TREATMENT OF REFUSALS TO LICENSE 
PATENTS 
 
In Verizon, the Supreme Court found that an incumbent local 
exchange carrier did not have a duty under Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act to provide rivals with access to its telephone network.82  By 
relying solely on Verizon as precedent, Judge Kaplan’s decision 
misses an important distinction between the physical telephone 
network (in which Verizon has property rights) and “thirty-one bit 
technology” (which is recognized as IBM’s property only to the extent 
                                                
78 The patents in issue are U.S. Patent No. 5,696,709 (filed Mar. 31, 1995), “Program 
controlled rounding modes” (allowing application to select machine’s rounding 
method); U.S. Patent No. 5,825,678 (filed Mar. 31, 1995), “Method and apparatus 
for determining floating point data class” (adapting S/390 instruction format to IEEE 
standard; means-plus-function claim); U.S. Patent No. 5,953,520 (filed Sept. 22, 
1997), “Address translation buffer for data processing system emulation mode” 
(allowing pipelining of memory accesses); U.S. Patent No. 5,987,495 (filed Nov. 7, 
1997), “Restoring program context following an interrupt,” (providing recovery 
functionality in firmware rather than OS); and U.S. Patent No. 6,801,993 (filed Sept. 
28, 2001), “Table offset for shortening translation tables from their beginnings” 
(allowing for compaction of sparse tables in virtual memory).  See T3 Complaint, 
IBM v. Platform Solutions, supra note 10. 
79 See generally Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1311-19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(describing the range of intrinsic and extrinsic evidence that may bear on claim 
construction). 
80 See Irene Plagianos, T3 Technologies v. IBM, CORP. COUNSEL, Jan. 1, 2010, at 28. 
81 See Foley, supra note 10 (noting IBM’s understanding that the Department of 
Justice had requested litigation documents from T3). 
82 Verizon, 540 U.S. at 410-11. 
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provided by the intellectual property laws).  Patent law does not award 
to IBM plenary rights in “its thirty-one bit technology,” but only 
limited rights of exclusion over the subject matter of its valid and 
enforceable claims. 
There are two leading precedents that specifically address 
antitrust treatment of unilateral refusals to license patents.  Both take 
into account the limited scope of the patent grant, but with different 
conclusions.  In Xerox (2000), the Federal Circuit held that a 
patentee’s right to refuse to license a patent is limited only in 
circumstances where there is “illegal tying, fraud in the Patent and 
Trademark Office, or sham litigation . . . so long as [any] 
anticompetitive effect is not illegally extended beyond the statutory 
patent grant.”83  This holding suggests that unilateral refusals to 
license a patent are always legal, except where there is a separate basis 
for legal liability. 
The Ninth Circuit in Image Technical (1997), however, held 
that the validity of a patentee’s desire to exclude others as a legitimate 
business justification was only a “rebuttable presumption.”84  In Image 
Technical, Kodak had instituted a new policy of refusing to sell parts 
for its photocopiers to independent service companies and their 
customers.  Kodak argued that the policy was intended to protect its 
intellectual property.  The Ninth Circuit found sufficient evidence to 
rebut this argument in the facts that only sixty-five of Kodak’s 
thousands of parts were patented and that Kodak’s intellectual 
property argument was made only belatedly.85  The court also 
emphasized that a refusal to license a patent may not be used to 
“extend a lawful monopoly beyond the grant” of the patent.86 
Given that patents grant exclusionary rights over inventions, 
not products, it is not clear when the refusal to license a patent may be 
said to cause an anticompetitive effect beyond the patent grant.  The 
Patent Act itself does not provide adequate guidance on this point.  
The Federal Circuit in Xerox cited section 271(d) of the patent statute 
in support of its permissive approach to unilateral refusals to license. 
This provision, added by Congress in 1988, states in relevant part: 
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement 
. . . of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed guilty of 
misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of 
                                                
83 In re Indep. Serv. Org. Antitrust Litig. (Xerox), 203 F.3d 1322, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 
2000). 
84 Image Technical Servs., Inc., v. Eastman Kodak, 125 F.3d 1195, 1218 (9th Cir. 
1997). 
85 Id. at 1218-20. 
86 Id. at 1216 (citing Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 
(1944)). 
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his having . . . (4) refused to license or use any rights to the 
patent. . .87 
The legislative history accompanying this amendment, however, only 
cites cases involving complete refusals to license patents.88  In 
contrast, T3’s complaint does not allege a complete refusal to license, 
but a selective refusal to license to FSI and PSI with the purpose and 
effect of restraining competition in the mainframe platform market. 
Antitrust is concerned with competition in markets defined to 
include products having reasonable interchangeability of use.89  By 
permitting complete refusals to license, section 271(d) contemplates 
that a patent owner may exercise market power by restricting output 
and thwarting demand for the use of its intellectual property: i.e., the 
ability to make, use, sell or import the patented invention.90  A 
selective refusal to license, however, may allow a patent owner to 
exercise market power against parties who derive no benefit from 
practicing the patented invention.  As one commentator has explained 
in connection with the Xerox case, such an exercise of market power 
may accurately be described as exceeding the scope of the patent 
grant: 
In Xerox the reason why the ISOs needed Xerox’s parts was 
not because these parts were patented, but because they were 
the only parts available to service Xerox’s copiers.  In using 
them to service Xerox’s copiers’ end-users, the ISOs did not 
appropriate Xerox’s legal reward, because the ISOs did not 
benefit from the invention, the end-users did.  In refusing to 
deal with anyone but the end-users, Xerox necessarily 
imposed itself as the only service provider, since the ISOs 
had no access to parts.  Thus, Xerox foreclosed and 
monopolized a market unrelated to its intellectual property, 
using means that had nothing to do with the reward it was 
                                                
87 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) (2006). 
88 See Mark R. Patterson, When is Property Intellectual? The Leveraging Problem, 
73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1151 & n.81 (2000) (citing 134 CONG. REC. H10646, 
H10648 (daily ed. Oct. 1988)). 
89 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962) (“The outer 
boundaries of a product market are determined by the reasonable interchangeability 
of use or the cross-elasticity of demand between the product itself and substitutes for 
it.”); United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 404 (1956) 
(“The ‘market’ which one must study to determine when a producer has monopoly 
power will vary with the part of commerce under consideration.  The tests are 
constant.  That market is composed of products that have reasonable 
interchangeability for the purposes for which they are produced — price, use and 
qualities considered.”). 
90 See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (defining patent infringement as making, using, 
offering to sell, selling, or importing a patented invention without authorization). 
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legally entitled to secure.91 
Similarly, according to T3’s complaint, FSI’s and PSI’s only interest 
in using IBM’s patented technology was for providing a platform that 
would correctly support the specifications required by IBM’s 
mainframe operating system.92  To the extent that the users of IBM-
compatible mainframes derived a benefit from the use of IBM’s 
patented inventions,93 IBM could have fully captured this value 
through end-user royalties for its mainframe operating systems.  
Instead, according to T3, IBM selectively refused to license its patents 
to FSI and PSI, imposed itself as the only mainframe hardware 
provider, and restrained competition and innovation in the mainframe 
platform market beyond the scope of IBM’s patent rights. 
T3’s appeal stands at a legal crossroads.  The Federal Circuit’s 
Xerox decision and the Ninth Circuit’s Kodak decision express very 
different views on the scope of a patent owner’s right to refuse to 
license its intellectual property.  Neither precedent is binding on the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, but the court may look to them for 
guidance as persuasive authorities in T3’s case.94 
                                                
91 Simon Genevaz, Against Immunity for Unilateral Refusals to Deal in Intellectual 
Property: Why Antitrust Law Should Not Distinguish Between IP and Other 
Property Rights, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 741, 767-68 (2004); see also Seungwoo 
Son, Selective Refusals to Sell Patented Goods: The Relationship Between Patent 
Rights and Antitrust Law, 2002 U. Ill. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 109, 163 (2002) (arguing 
that a selective refusal to license “may harm competition in complementary or 
relevant markets because it excludes competitors in a circumstance where they have 
no alternative except to access the patentee’s property”). 
92 See also A. Douglas Melamed & Ali M. Stoeppelwerth, The CSU Case: Facts, 
Formalism and the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law, 10 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 407, 424 (2002) (“Antitrust counsel would advise an AT&T of 
today . . . that it could immunize its anticompetitive refusal to deal from the antitrust 
laws by contriving to design its system so that firms like MCI that need access to its 
network would have to use patented or copyrighted interfaces that, under [Xerox], it 
may refuse to license.  In that event, competition would be injured, and network 
design and innovation would be distorted and presumably diminished.”); cf. Joseph 
P. Bauer, Refusals to Deal With Competitors by Owners of Patents and Copyrights: 
Reflections on the Image Technical and Xerox Decisions, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 1211, 
1225 (2006) (“[T]he holding in Xerox led to a form of over-incentivizing the creation 
of patentable machines or machine parts.”). 
93 For example, one of the patents IBM asserted against PSI serves as “a processor 
mechanism that provides a direct resumption of an earlier interrupted program” 
without the need for state transitions and other “performance negatives” that would 
apply to the approach of implementing such a feature in an operating system.  See 
U.S. Patent No. 5,987,495, cols. 3-4.  For a skeptical view of the incremental value 
of patented inventions to software products in a refusal-to-deal context, see Michael 
A. Carrier, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 761, 823 
(2002). 
94 Under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006), the Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to 
hear appeals from Patent Office rulings.  In Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air 
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Despite the divergence between the two approaches, both 
Xerox and Kodak recognize the limiting role of patent scope in 
defining the right of a patentee unilaterally to refuse to license a patent 
under the antitrust laws.95  The failure of Judge Kaplan’s opinion in 
IBM v. PSI to acknowledge this limitation leaves the scope of a patent 
owner’s “right to use its intellectual property as it wishes” unclear.96  
It remains to be seen whether either the appellate proceedings or the 
Justice Department’s investigation of the world’s leading patent owner 
will produce the necessary vehicle for resolving this ambiguity at the 
intersection of antitrust and intellectual property law. 
 
 VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
While Microsoft involves copyrights and T3 v. IBM involves 
patents, the proper adjudication of the antitrust claims in each case 
requires a careful delineation of the legitimate scope of monopoly 
power contemplated within the statutory intellectual property grant.  
Such an analysis was absent from both the D.C. Circuit’s categorical 
rejection of Microsoft’s primary copyright counterclaims and Judge 
Kaplan’s equally summary dismissal of T3’s antitrust claims.  With 
the benefit of a complete trial record in Microsoft, it was eventually 
possible to determine that Microsoft’s exclusionary conduct indeed 
exceeded the scope of its copyright grant.97  The Second Circuit 
should recognize in T3 v. IBM an important opportunity to clarify the 
boundary between antitrust and the legitimate exercise of rights within 
the scope of a patent grant. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                               
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 834 (2002), however, the Supreme Court held 
that this exclusive jurisdiction applies only in cases where the plaintiff’s initial 
complaint properly states a patent law claim.  Since the patent issues in Xerox were 
raised only by the defendant as counterclaims, the Federal Circuit’s opinion in that 
case is not binding on other circuits and carries only persuasive authority.  See 
Telecom Technical Servs., Inc., v. Rolm Co., 388 F.3d 820, 826 (11th Cir. 2004). 
95 See also Mercoid, 320 U.S. at 665-66 (noting that the patent system “denies to the 
patentee after issuance the power to use [the patent] in such a way as to acquire a 
monopoly which is not plainly within the terms of the grant.”). 
96 Cf. Michael Carrier, Refusals to License Intellectual Property After Trinko, 55 
DEPAUL L. REV. 1191, 1209 (2006) (noting the lack of a Supreme Court opinion 
directly addressing refusals to license intellectual property, but predicting that 
Verizon v. Trinko “likely will make it more difficult to challenge such activity”). 
97 In connection with receiving Judge Jackson’s permission to comment on the 
Microsoft case, see Chin, supra note 20, at 1 n.*, the author agreed to delay 
publication of his commentary until the conclusion of the remedies proceedings on 
remand. 
